Treaty Politics and the Rise of Executive Agreements by Krutz Glen S.;Peake Jeffrey S.;

Author:Krutz, Glen S.;Peake, Jeffrey S.;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: University of Michigan Press

Senators Helms and Symms Block the

Genocide Convention

With a supportive conservative Republican president, a prestigious and powerful attorneys’ group on board, and widespread support among senators in both parties, the Genocide Convention appeared ready to move through the Republican-controlled Senate in late 1984. President Reagan announced his support of the treaty on September 5. On September 19, the SFRC approved the treaty by a vote of seventeen to zero, in effect reporting it to the full Senate (Exec. Rpt. 98-50). Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), who was then caught in a tough reelection battle in North Carolina and was taking heat on his position on the Genocide Convention, voted “present” in the committee vote.

Once under consideration by the full Senate, Senator Helms and Senator Steven Symms (R-ID) sought to block the treaty through procedural tactics. Although not saying outright that the Senate should defeat the pact, the senators’ delay tactics had the same effect, as time was running out in the Ninety-eighth Congress. When the Senate began floor consideration of the Genocide Convention on October 10, Senator Helms was present on the floor and asked a series of questions about proper floor consideration of treaties. The presiding officer, Senator Dave Durenburger (R-MN), “revealed that the Senate was required to take at least two days to give final approval to the treaty and an associated resolution of ratification unless Senate rules were waived by unanimous consent” (CQ Almanac 1984: 2626).25

Senator Helms stopped short of opposing the treaty outright, but he made it clear through questioning of the presiding officer that he would rise to oppose any unanimous consent agreement that allowed the Senate to proceed more quickly than the required two days. With time running out in the session before one-third of the senators had to return to their states to face election, Helms’s maneuver had the same effect as defeating the treaty through filibuster. Senator Symms, who had been even more outspoken in his opposition to the pact than Helms, had threatened to filibuster final consideration.26 With the waiving of the two-day requirement not seeming possible given Senator Helms’s floor remarks and with the likelihood that Symms would filibuster should they take up the resolution of ratification, Senate floor leaders relented, as time was running short in the session. Instead of taking up the resolution of ratification, senators quickly considered and overwhelmingly passed (by a vote of eighty-seven to two) a resolution supportive of the Genocide Convention’s ideas, pledging to move quickly on the pact during 1985 (LeBlanc 1991).

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